First a detailed de nition of group signatures, originally suggested by Chaum and van Heijst, is given. Such signatures allow members of a group to sign messages anonymously on behalf of the group subject to the constraint that in case of disputes later on a designated authority can identify the signer. It is shown that if such schemes are to provide information theoretic anonymity, then the length of the secret information of the members and the authority increases with the number of members and the number of signatures each member is allowed to make. A dynamic scheme meeting these lower bounds is described. Unlike previous suggestions it protects each member unconditionally against framing, i.e. being hold responsible for a signature made by someone else.
Introduction
Group signatures as introduced in CH91] allow members of a group (e.g. a company or family) to make signatures on behalf of the group in such a way that only members can make signatures, the actual member who made a given signature remains anonymous except that
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Such a signature scheme can for example be used in invitations to submit tenders. All companies submitting a tender then form a group and each company signs its tender anonymously using the group signature. Later when the preferred tender has been selected the winner can be identi ed, whereas the signers of all other tenders will remain anonymous. All submitters are bound to their tender by the signature, as the signer can be identi ed without his cooperation.
Related Work
Group signatures should not be confused with the related notion of group oriented signatures rst suggested in Boy89b] and CH89]. Here certain subsets of a group of people are allowed to sign on behalf of the group. Such schemes do not provide a method for identifying the (subset of) members who actually made the signature (see D93] for an overview). Another related concept is that of multi-signatures which require a digital signature from many persons (see O88] and OO93]). As mentioned above, group signatures were introduced by Chaum and van Heijst in CH91] (see also H92]). They present four schemes: one protects the anonymity of the signer unconditionally, whereas the other three only give computational protection. These schemes also di er with respect to the following two properties:
Framing: A group member, P, is said to be framed if other persons (including group members) make a signature for which the trusted authority will identify P as the signer.
Dynamic:
A group signature scheme is called dynamic if the group members do not have to change their secret keys when the group is changed (members leaving or new members joining). Only the public key of the group and possibly the secret key of new members must be changed.
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In particular, the scheme from CH91] providing unconditional anonymity is not dynamic and it only protects against framing under a cryptographic assumption.
In CP94] a dynamic scheme providing unconditional anonymity is presented, but security against framing relies on a cryptographic assumption.
Results and Contents
This paper contains three main results:
Group signatures are de ned in details in Section 2. Based on this de nition, the method of double-signing introduced in CP94] is formalised (Section 3).
A dynamic group signature scheme providing unconditional anonymity and unconditional protection against framing is presented (see Section 4).
Lower bounds on the sizes of secret keys and auxiliary information of the authority are given (see Section 5). These bounds say that the length of the secret key of each member grows as T log 2 n, if each member can make T signatures and n is the number of members. Similarly, the length of the auxiliary information of the authority grows as Tn log 2 n. The scheme presented in Section 4 actually meets these bounds except for constant factors.
De nitions
In this section secure group signatures are de ned. Throughout this paper M denotes the message space.
De nition 1 A group signature for a group of n members P 1 ; :::; P n and an authority A is a tuple (n; k; gen; sign; test; iden). Here k is the security parameter, and gen, sign, test, iden are all polynomial time (in k) algorithms. 4 2 DEFINITIONS gen is a probabilistic algorithm generating the keys. On input (k; n) it outputs (pk; (s 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s n ); aux); where pk is the public key of the group, s i is the secret key of P i , i = 1; 2; :::; n, and aux is the auxiliary information for A. sign is a probabilistic algorithm which on input s i and m 2 M outputs sign(s i ; m). A string is called a correct signature on m 2 M, if there exists i 2 f1; 2; : : :; ng such that = sign(s i ; m).
test is used to test signatures. On input pk, m, and a possible signature on m, it outputs true or false. A string is called an acceptable signature on m with respect to pk if test(pk; m; ) = true.
iden is used by A to identify the signer. On input aux, m 2 M and an acceptable signature on m, it outputs i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng f?g (the output ? indicates that iden could not identify the signer).
For any i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng, and any m 2 M, the scheme must satisfy test(pk; m; sign(s i ; m)) = true; and iden(aux; m; sign(s i ; m)) = i:
Remark Di erent secret keys must produce di erent signatures:
8i; j 2 f1; 2; :::; ng 8m 2 M : i 6 = j ) sign(s i ; m) 6 = sign(s j ; m):
Remark A correct signature is also acceptable, but an acceptable signature is not necessarily correct.
According to the informal description in the introduction group signatures must provide Security against forgeries.
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Anonymity of the signer.
The authority must be able to identify the signer.
Each of these properties will be de ned in the following.
Security Against Forgeries
It must be infeasible to forge signatures in adaptively chosen message attacks (see GMR88]). Let F be a polynomial time algorithm, which on input pk and possibly aux, works as follows. where (m 0 ;~ (m 0 )) is the output of F. The probability is over the random coins of signatures and the random coins of F.
Anonymity
Every group member should be able to make signatures on behalf of the group without leaking any (Shannon-) information about his identity.
To de ne this the distribution of the secret keys is needed.
2 DEFINITIONS
A public key pk, produced by gen, corresponds to a set of possible secret keys de ned as SK(pk) = f(sk 1 ; sk 2 ; :::; sk n ) j 9aux : gen(n; k) = (pk; (sk 1 ; sk 2 ; : : :; sk n ); aux)g: We will omit pk in the following. The set SK (i) is de ned as all the possible secret keys of P i , i = 1; 2; : : :; n, i.e. SK There are two aspects of this de nition. Firstly, for jJj = 1 it says that the signer must be identi ed by the authority with overwhelming probability. Secondly, it says that no subset of (polynomially bounded) group members can frame a member outside this subset.
Secure Group Signatures
The preceding three de nitions give De nition 5 A group signature scheme is secure for signing T messages, if it is secure against forgery, provides anonymity and signer identi cation after each member has made at most T signatures.
Remark The de nition easily generalises to let P i sign T i messages, i = 1; 2; : : :; n. 8 3 IDENTIFYING THE SIGNER 3 Identifying the signer CP94] sketched a general method by which the authority can identify the signer. In the following this method is described in terms of the previous de nitions.
Let (n; k; gen; sign; test; iden) be a group signature scheme which satis es De nition 2 and 3 for signing T messages. This scheme can be used to construct a new one which under certain conditions satis es De nition 5 for signing T messages. The new scheme will be denoted by (n; k; gen 0 ; sign 0 ; test 0 ; iden 0 ) and is de ned as gen 0 (k; n): execute gen(k; n) twice with independent random bits. This gives (pk i ; (s 1i ; s 2i ; : : : ; s n;i ); aux i ) for i = 1; 2. The output of gen 0 (k; n) is now de ned as Since di erent group members make di erent signatures iden 0 is well de ned. Thus, the new scheme consists of two independent versions of the original scheme. Each member has two secret keys, and the authority knows one of these.
Proposition 6 The scheme (n; k; gen 0 ; sign 0 ; test 0 ; iden 0 ) de ned above is secure against forgeries and provides anonymity for signing T messages.
Proof Forging a signature require forging a signature with respect to pk 2 . This is infeasible by the properties of the original scheme.
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The scheme provides anonymity because the original scheme provides anonymity. u t By the de nition of iden 0 the extended scheme can be used to identify members making correct signatures. Furthermore, under certain circumstances it can be shown that the extended scheme satis es the requirements to signer identi cation. This proof often depends on the actual schemes (see Section 4.2.3 for an example).
In three of the schemes in CH91] double-signing will make it easier to identify the signer than using the interactive protocols proposed there (at the cost of twice as long signatures).
Obtaining Unconditional Anonymity
This section presents a group signature scheme giving unconditional anonymity. First, the basic ingredients are presented, and then it is shown how these can be used to construct a group signature scheme.
Throughout this section let G q denote a (multiplicative) group of prime order, q.
Basic Signature
The basic signature can very brie y be described as a combination of the identi cation protocol of O93] and the fail-stop signature scheme of HP93].
Let two generators g 1 and g 2 of G q be given. The scheme is only intended for signing one message, because given signatures on two di erent messages, the secret key can be derived by solving two linear equations.
This also means that in order to forge a signature (given a signature) the forger must be able to compute the secret key. Thus, it is sucient to argue that the secret key cannot be computed from a single signature.
Firstly, does not help computing the secret key, because given the public key all values of are equally likely (there are q possible secret keys and they will all give a di erent value of because m 6 = e mod q). Secondly, if c is chosen uniformly at random, an execution of the protocol in Figure 1 does not help computing the secret key. Thus under the assumption that computing c as H(m; ; a; ) corresponds to choosing it at random, the signature scheme is secure.
Group Signatures
We only consider the case with two persons (P 1 and P 2 ) in the group (the general case is obtained by a straightforward extension). Let T be a parameter, and let T + 1 generators g 0 ; g 1 ; : : : ; g T of G q be given.
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These are chosen initially by a key authentication centre (or the group authority) such that for some e 2 Z Z q g i = g e i?1 for i = 1; 2; : : :; T:
The message space is M = Z Z q n feg as before. It is important that no group member knows e. We therefore need the following extended discrete logarithm assumption:
Assumption 1 Let A be any polynomially bounded algorithm which takes q and (g 0 ; : : : ; g T ) chosen at random as described above as input and outputs a number d 2 Z Z q . Then the probability that In the analysis of this scheme it is sometimes necessary to consider the general scheme with n members. This scheme is easily derived from the case n = 2, and is shown in Appendix B. Proof Using the same arguments as in S93] it can be shown that the protocol is a proof of knowledge as claimed.
Group Signatures
Witness indistinguishability is proved by considering the distribution of the messages, which the prover sends. First it is shown that two provers knowing di erent witnesses to the same h i , say h 1 , produce messages with the same distribution. Then it shown that a prover knowing a witness to h 1 cannot be distinguished from a prover knowing a witness to h 2 (the protocol for a prover knowing a witness to h 2 is symmetric to that in Figure 2 ).
An execution with witness (s 10 ; : : :; s 1T ) using (t 10 ; : : :; t 1T ) will give exactly the same messages as an execution with secret key ( The lemma now follows from the fact that the proof in Figure 2 is witness indistinguishable (i.e., the proof-part of the signature reveals no additional information about the actual secret key). u t Remark If a member makes less than T signatures, his secret key is information-theoretically protected. If he makes T signatures, the key can be computed if e and e i are known. However, this is assumed to be hard (see Assumption 1). i : Furthermore, in order to produce such a signature it is necessary to know (a 0 ; a 1 ; : : : ; a T ). By knowing (a 0 ; a 1 ; : : :; a T ) we simply mean that the ability to forge a signature requires the ability to convince a veri er in the interactive protocol. As this is a proof of knowledge we can use the corresponding knowledge extractor to obtain (a 0 ; a 1 ; : : :; a T ).
Lemma 9 Given P i 's signatures on T ?1 di erent messages even with unlimited computing power it is infeasible to nd P i 's signature on a new message with probability better than 1=q.
Proof Given l signatures from P i there are q T?l possible secret keys. u t
This lemma says that it is hard to nd two di erent secret keys corresponding to the same public key.
Proposition 11 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the scheme is secure against forgeries after signing T ? 1 messages.
Proof By Assumption 2 it is not feasible to construct a signature unless the forger knows a secret key corresponding to the public key of one of the members. Thus if the forged signature is acceptable and not correct, the forger must know a possible secret key which is di erent from those held by the members. By Lemma 10 it is infeasible to nd such a key. Next, Lemma 9 shows that even an unlimited powerful forger cannot construct a correct signature. u t
The above proposition only proves security after signing T ? 1 messages (for each member). However, it is conceivable that the scheme also provides security against forgery after each member has signed T messages. In particular, from an additional correct signature it is easy to nd the secret key of one of the members. Furthermore, no matter how many signature a member makes it remains hard to nd an acceptable signature, which is not correct (under Assumptions 1 and 2).
Thus it is su cient to show that it is infeasible to nd the secret key of P i given P i 's signatures on T messages m 1 ; : : :; m T . However, we know of no formal proof of this.
Anonymity
If a member signs T +1 messages, then his secret key can be calculated. However, the following shows that the scheme provides anonymity for signing T messages.
Proposition 12 The scheme provides anonymity for signing T messages.
Proof Let a subset J of f1; 2; : : :; ng and L jJjT di erent messages be given. Given signatures on these messages made by the members of J such that each P i has made at most T of these. We have to show that for each i 2 I J (T; L) the event (m) ( i occurs with the same probability.
Let i 2 I J (T; L) be given. If r occurs l r times in i then there are exactly q T?l r possible secret keys of P r . The probability that P r has a secret key in this set is q ?l r . Since the secret key of each member is chosen independently of each other, the probability that all P r 's have a secret key corresponding to i is 
Identifying the Signer
In order to obtain a group signature scheme, we use the method of double-signing described in Section 3. By Proposition 6 it is su cient to show that De nition 4 is satis ed.
Proposition 13 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the scheme provides signer identi cation for signing T ? 1 messages if double-signing is used. which is exponentially small in k. Next consider the event that id =?. This means that the signature is acceptable, but not correct. By the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 10 it can be shown to be hard to make such a signature in polynomial time. Thus Prob id =?] is smaller than the inverse of any polynomial for q su ciently large. u t Remark Even with unlimited computing power it is infeasible to frame another group member (this corresponds to the event id 2 J c ).
4 OBTAINING UNCONDITIONAL ANONYMITY
Proof Suppose there exists a subset J of f1; 2; : : :; ng, and an algorithm F J , which after getting at most T ? 1 signatures from each P i , i 2 J c , can output a message m 0 and an acceptable signature (m
The Scheme is Dynamic
The scheme is dynamic in the sense that new members can always join the group using the following procedure: 2. The public key of the group is extended by adding (h 1 ;h 1 ) . 3. The secret keys 1 is added to the auxiliary information of the authority. Dynamic schemes have not been de ned formally, but it should be intuitively clear that the new scheme satis es the same properties as the original one.
Lower Bounds
The scheme in Section 4.2 has the unfortunate property that the length of the secret keys as well as the auxiliary information grows as the number of of signatures grows. In this section it is shown that this cannot be avoided in schemes providing unconditional anonymity (see CH91] and CP94] for schemes with only computational anonymity in which the length of the secret keys and auxiliary information is independent of the number of signatures).
Secret Key
The main idea for proving the lower bound of the secret keys is to divide the set of possible secret keys of each member into nonempty, disjoint subsets. Then the number of possible secret keys is bounded by the number of subsets. where s i is the secret key of P i (i = 1; 2; : : :; n). SK (r) i (m) is the set of possible keys of P r which will give P i j 's signature on m j for j = 1; 2; : : :; t.
Lemma 14 If a group signature (n; k; gen; sign; test; iden) provides anonymity for signing T messages, then for any t T, the following holds: For all i = (i 1 ; i 2 ; :::; i t ), and any t di erent messages m = which contradicts De nition 1, since di erent members must make different signatures.
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Second, by Lemma 14, for any t di erent messages m = (m 1 ; :::; m t ), and any t-tuple i = (i 1 ; i 2 ; :::; i t ) 2 f1; 2; :::; ng t , jSK u t Thus each member must have a secret key chosen from a set of at least n T possible secret keys. In other words, at least T log n bits are needed to represent some of the secret keys of each group member. Thus, its length grows linearly in the number of signatures.
Auxiliary Information
In this section, we consider the length of the auxiliary information held by the authority. To this end some random variables are needed. 1. Generate (pk; (s 1 ; : : :; s n ); aux) using gen.
2. Choose i 1 ; i 2 ; : : :; i L 2 I(T; L) uniformly at random. Let AUX be the random variable of the authority's auxiliary information (de ned on the probability space induced by gen). Let ID be the uniformly distributed random variable taking the value (i 1 ; i 2 ; : : : ; i L ).
From the de nition of unconditional anonymity, the following lemma is obtained.
Lemma 17 If the group signature scheme (n; k; gen; sign; test; iden) n! e ?n n n p 2 n gives log (Tn)! (T!) n Tn log n + log p 2 Tn ? n log p 2 T Tn(log n ? 1):
This completes the proof.
u t
This bound can be interpreted as follows. The authority needs some information corresponding to each signature that each member is allowed to make | in total nT pieces. Each of these must be be linked to the actual member | this requires log n bits.
Comparison with Suggested Scheme
In the scheme presented in Section 4.2 the length of the secret key is 2(T + 1) log q bits. Taking into account that this scheme allows up to q members this scheme meets the lower bound except for a factor of 2 originating from double signing. The length of the auxiliary information is n(T + 1) log q bits. Again this meets the lower bound.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the length of the signatures in the scheme of Section 4.2 grows linearly in the number of group members and signatures. However, this need not always be the case (e.g. see CH91] for a scheme with constant length signatures).
A ONE OUT OF N WITNESSES A One out of n Witnesses
This appendix sketches Schoenmakers method for proving knowledge of one out of many witnesses given in S93] and further elaborated on in CDS94].
Let G q denote a group of prime order q and let g be a generator of G q . The common input to the prover and veri er is (g; h 1 ; : : : ; h n ) for some n 2 IN, where each h i 2 G q . Let h i = g x i , i = 1; 2; : : :; n. The protocol in Figure 3 is a proof of knowledge of x i ; i = 1; 2; : : :; n. Now suppose that the prover only knows one of the n witnesses. Given one of x i 's as secret input, the prover shows that he knows w such that for some i 2 f1; 2; : : :; ng: h i = g w . The protocol is sketched in Figure 4 for the case w = x 1 .
Intuitively, the challenge c = P n 1 d i , gives the prover freedom to choose (n ? 1) of the d j 's. Therefore, the prover must know at least one of the n witnesses. However the prover's messages do not reveal any information about which d j 's the prover chooses initially.
Proposition 19 ( Remark An extension of this protocol allows the prover to show that he knows at least k out of n secret keys (see S93]). Figure 5: Interactive proof that is correct with respect to one of h 1 ; h 2 ; : : :; h n | here P knows the secret key corresponding to h i . The subscripts j and k are over f1; 2; : : :; ng and f0; 1; : : :; Tg, respectively.
